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Patent Deception in Standard Setting: the Case for Antitrust
Policy
Herbert Hovenkamp1
Introduction: Patent Continuations and Divisionals
Many patent applications are rejected upon initial submission,
but they are almost never rejected with absolute finality. Further,
subsequent to filing its original application a patent applicant might
wish to write an application with broader or somewhat different
claims, or perhaps add claims that were not made in the original
application. Or it may wish to rewrite claims that had been rejected
in the original application. A patent "continuation" is an application
for additional claims made on a patent that was previously applied
for.
A "divisional" application is a particular type of patent
continuation in which the original patent application lacked "unity."
"Unity of invention" is said to be a prerequisite for patenting because
a patent may relate to only one invention, or perhaps to a group of
closely related inventions. When a patent is rejected for lack of unity
the patentee may then file a "divisional" application for spin-off of
second, third, or subsequent inventions.2 The PTO may reject a
patent altogether for lack of unity, or it may grant a patent on one
invention while leaving the patentee free to file later divisional
1

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

2

The Patent Act provides for continuations in 35 U.S.C. '132. On possible
abuses, see Mark A. Lemley and Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 Boston Univ. L.Rev. 63 (2004); Christina Bohann and Herbert
Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, ___ B.C.L.Rev. ___ (2010)
(in press), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=106256
In such cases the original application is called the "parent." Typically the
patentee will claim one invention off the parent application, and then begin a
process of filing additional "divisional" applications for other inventions covered by
the patent. When these later divisional applications are granted the priority date of
those patents ordinarily relates back to the date of the parent. Further, the claims
language in the subsequent divisional applications need not be identical with that
in the parent and can cover technology that was not actually contemplated in the
parent.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002
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applications for other inventions that were arguably covered in the
original application.
Under generally accepted patent practices in the United
States, when a subsequent continuation or divisional application is
granted the subsequent patent "relates back" to the date of the
original patent application, and will typically retain the original
application's priority over rival filings.
While patent continuations are an accepted part of the arcane
process under which patents are granted, they can also bring
considerable anticompetitive abuse.3 In particular, the continuation
process makes it possible for a patentee to write updated claims
designed to exclude a rival's invention that has been placed on the
market subsequent to the date of the original application. For
example, a patent applicant might file an overly broad patent
application in 2000. In 2001 someone else might place a new
invention on the market. The 2000 applicant might then file a
continuation or divisional application expressly designed to cover the
2001 invention and claim priority over it, even though the 2001
3

In 2007 the PTO promulgated amendments to its procedures that were
intended to limit the number of continuation and divisional applications relating to a
particular parent patent.
However, a federal district court struck these
amendments down as exceeding the PTO's rule making authority. Tafas v. Dudas,
511 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D.Va. 2007). As the court described the proposed rules:
Under the old system, an applicant could file an unlimited number of
continuing applications, RCEs [request for continued examination], and
claims. The Final Rules modify that system in the several ways. First, Final
Rules 78 and 114 allow an applicant to file two continuation or
continuation-in-part applications, plus a single RCE, after an initial
application as a matter of right. If the applicant wants to engage in further
prosecution, a third continuation or continuation-in-part application or a
second RCE can be filed with a "petition and showing" that explains why
the amendment, argument, or evidence could not have been presented in
one of the previously-filed applications.
Id. at 657-658. See also Tafas v. Dudas, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2008 WL
859467 (E.D.Va. Apr. 1, 2008) (rules promulgated by PTO were substantive in
character and exceeded PTO's rule making authority; granting motion for summary
judgment).
Note that a provision included in the House version of the 2007 Patent
Reform Act at the time of this writing would overrule Tafas by explicitly giving the
PTO rule making authority.
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inventor had no reasonable way of knowing that its invention was
subject to an "earlier" patent. If a divisional patent is later granted in,
say, 2002, its priority date will relate back to the 2000 patent.4 The
harmfulness of this process is exacerbated by the fact that the
publication requirements for pending patent applications in the
United States are very weak, requiring publication only 18 months
after filing, and even then only if the application is not subject to
foreign filing as well.5 Even if the application is published a rival
cannot know with certainty what its claims will be until final approval.
The possibility of such abuses reveals one of the more
deficient aspects of the patent system's failure to provide adequate
notice to inventors, as discussed previously.6 While patents may be
4

Lemley and Moore cite these cases as examples,
parentheticals:

with these

[In] Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (E.D. Cal.
2002), the plaintiff filed a patent application covering monoclonal
antibodies in 1984, a time when the technology was in its infancy. It kept
various applications pending in the PTO until 1999, when it drafted new
claims designed to cover not just monoclonal antibodies as they were
understood in 1984, but new types of antibodies developed in the
intervening 15 years, including those invented by the defendant. Id. at
1151-52. Another example is Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134
F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The patentee there amended his claims to a
reclining chair to claim placing the controls for that chair in a position he
never thought of, but saw for the first time on his competitor's product. Id.
at 1479 ("Sproule admitted at trial that he did not consider placing the
controls outside the console until he became aware that some of Gentry's
competitors were so locating the recliner controls.").
See Lemley and Moore, Ending Abuse, note 2, 84 Boston Univ.L.Rev. at 7677.
5

See 35 U.S.C. '122(b).

6

See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkmap, Antitrust Law ¶704a,b (3d
ed. 2008). See James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 62-65 (2008), noting,
inter alia, that the number of continuing applications had increased seven-fold in
the previous twenty years. Further,
Applicants can change claim language in patents without updating the
published applications. The final claim language is published only after
the patent is issued, and the gap between application date and issuance is
growing. Moreover, publication does little to prevent patent applicants
from introducing unanticipated new claims via continuing applications.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002
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a species of property, they are property with a woefully inadequate
system for recording titles and making them public prior to someone
else's investment decision. To the extent a patentee can manipulate
the continuation or divisional process to write patent claims on the
existing inventions of other inventors who did not have adequate
prior notice of them, the policy reduces rather than increases the
incentive to innovate. An inventor might do a thorough patent search
and not find any prior claim on his invention, but later be made the
subject of an infringement suit on the basis of a continuing or
divisional application that was filed later but that earns the priority of
the original patent application.
Nevertheless, there is probably little room for application of
the antitrust laws, given that the Federal Circuit has expressly
approved the use of continuation and divisional applications to write
updated claims on a competitor's existing products or technology.
The notice and publication provisions are part of the law as well.7
While we believe such an approach to the giving of notice deters
rather than promotes innovation, the fact is that conduct approved by

Id. at 63.
7

See Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister, 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed.
Cir. 1988):
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known
competitor's product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to
amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the
applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent
application. Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all
statutes and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the
marketplace is simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evidence deceitful
intent. To be sure, applicants do not simply have carte blanche to rewrite
their claims. The new claims must find adequate support in the original
application. If not, the patent will be invalid for lack of enablement or
written description, or alternatively, the new claims will be considered "new
matter" invented only as of the date the claims were added. If the
patentee can find some support in the original patent application for the
current claims, however, she can obtain legal rights over ideas that (at
least in that form) never occurred to her until she saw what others were
already doing.
Accord State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir.
1985). See Lemley article, note 1, 84 Boston Univ. L.Rev. at 77-78.
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law cannot form the basis of an antitrust claim when the patentee
later files an infringement action based on such an after-acquired
right.
Misrepresentation and Subsequent Assertion
of Continuation Claims.
While it is lawful to write patent continuations on the existing
technology of rivals, the standard-setting misrepresentation cases
add an additional element that can implicate the antitrust laws. To
take the simplest example, suppose that a firm has written a patent
application that is subject to further continuations or divisional
applications. During this period its application is unpublished. It then
participates in a standard setting organization that is developing new
technological standards. While participating in this fashion it also
surreptitiously writes continuation claims that are calculated to cover
the technology that the standard setting organization is developing.
After the participants have committed themselves to the
standardized technology it exposes its new patents, whose priority
dates back to the original patent, and insists on royalties from all
participants. Given the extent of their investment they have little
choice but to pay.
The Rambus case involved a research company that was in
the business of patenting designs for computer memory technology
and licensing these to memory chip manufacturers. In 1990 Rambus
had filed a single patent application, which the PTO found to
describe multiple inventions, thus permitting Rambus to file
numerous "divisional" applications derived from the original
application. During the next decade the PTO granted some one
dozen different patents based on these divisional applications.
These applications, which ran through 1999, were given a 1990
priority date based on the original patent application. In an extremely
fast moving technology market such as that for computer memory
this created at least an opportunity that subsequent divisionals could
have included claims for technology not reasonably contemplated in
the 1990 application. However, as noted previously, continuation
applications of this sort are completely proper under patent policy
even if the applicant writes the subsequent divisional applications
expressly to cover inventions developed subsequent to the original
application. The relation back doctrine means that the patent will
cover them. Any antitrust violation must consist not in writing the

6
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subsequent divisional applications in order to cover the technology
developed by others, but in the misrepresentations to and
participation in the standard-setting process.
One significant feature of computer memory chips is that they
must be compatible with a variety of computers. This requires that
chip producers develop a common set of standards for performance
and interoperability. The Electronic Industries Association, a trade
association including memory chip manufacturers, developed the
Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council (JEDEC) whose
assignment was continuously to develop and maintain
interchangeability standards for such chips. Rambus was a member
of JEDEC during the early 1990s, after it had filed its original patent
application, and when the standards for SDRAM ("synchronous
dynamic random access memory"). During that period the members
of JEDEC knew about original 1990s patent application, and also
knew that one divisional patent under that application had been
injured. However, Rambus did not disclose that it had additional
divisional applications in process. According to the FTC Rambus
also took advantage of its membership in JEDEC to formulate
additional divisional applications written on the very technology that
JEDEC was in the process of developing, all of which would obtain
the original 1990 priority date under PTO continuance rules.
In 1995 members of JEDEC began to become suspicious that
Rambus had undisclosed patent claims or was in the process of
perfecting new ones. Rambus refused to respond to a request to
disclose these rights and then withdrew from JEDEC in 1996.
In a subsequent patent infringement lawsuit that Rambus
brought against a JEDEC chip maker the Federal Circuit found the
patents in question to be valid and infringed. While Rambus may or
may not have acted fraudulently, computer chip makers who applied
the JEDEC standards would not necessarily have to infringe any of
Rambus' patents. The court also faulted JEDEC for failing to have
an unambiguous standard about disclosure of pending patent
applications:
In this case there is a staggering lack of defining details in the
EIA/JEDEC patent policy. When direct competitors participate
in an open standards committee, their work necessitates a
written patent policy with clear guidance on the committee's
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intellectual property position. A policy that does not define
clearly what, when, how, and to whom the members must
disclose does not provide a firm basis for the disclosure duty
necessary for a fraud verdict. Without a clear policy, members
form vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the
policy requires-whether the policy in fact so requires or not.
JEDEC could have drafted a patent policy with a broader
disclosure duty. It could have drafted a policy broad enough to
capture a member's failed attempts to mine a disclosed
specification for broader undisclosed claims. It could have. It
simply did not.8
While the decision raised no antitrust issues, the court did opine
that a rule creating a fiduciary duty on the part of JEDEC participants
to disclose their patent applications would raise a risk of collusion.9
A dissenter saw the fraud issue quite differently:
Rambus attended its first JEDEC meeting in December 1991
and became a member in February 1992. At the time Rambus
joined JEDEC, it had several pending patent applications
derived from the [1990] patent application, which has
spawned more than a thousand claims in dozens of
continuation and divisional applications. Rambus also had a
specific plan for using its pending patent applications against
anyone using the SDRAM standard....
Rambus did not, in fact, inform anyone at JEDEC about its
pending patent applications by the end of 1992. Instead,
Rambus continued to attend JEDEC meetings for three more
8

Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102-1103 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003).
9

Id. at 1096 n.7, 1102. On this point, see J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup
and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations (Jan. 9, 2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081997
(suggesting that the threat of oligopsony if standard setters are permitted to insist
on particular royalty commitments in advance could be as great or greater than the
threat of patent holdup royalties). See also Damien Gerardin & Anne LayneFarrar, The Logic and Limits of Ex Ante Competition in a Standard Setting
Environment, 3 Competition Pol'y Int'l 79 (2007). Contrast Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex.L.Rev. 1991 (2007).

8
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years, watching the SDRAM standard evolve and then
amending its patent applications to try to cover features of the
standard. Richard Crisp, Rambus's JEDEC representative,
testified at trial about how "Rambus was intentionally drafting
claims to intentionally cover the JEDEC SDRAMs...."
The record is replete with additional and specific instances of
Rambus employees attending JEDEC meetings, taking notes
of what was discussed, identifying instances where Rambus
already had claims covering what was discussed, and then
seeking claims to cover what they learned at the JEDEC
meetings. Yet Rambus "did not tell the people at JEDEC that
what they were proposing for standardization infringed [its]
patents."10

Deception is ordinarily a business tort that only rarely raises
serious '2 issues.11 Because of the lack of transparency in the
patent application process, however, deception about one's patents
can exclude, particularly when others make irreversible technological
commitments based on a false belief that the technology in question
was unpatented. The issue arises mainly in the context of multifirm
standard setting in which a participant lies, provides incomplete
information, or simply keeps silent about patents that it is in the
process of perfecting. The result can be adoption of this firm's
technology to the exclusion of another firm whose technology would
have been chosen had the true facts been known; or adoption of a
firm's technology under the mistaken impression that it was in the
public domain.
While active misrepresentations are reprehensible, silence is
typically a problem only when there is a duty to speak. The clearest
case for exclusionary conduct in the standard setting process arises
when (1) the defendant was a willing participant and the standard
setting organization ("SSO") has a clearly communicated policy of
requiring the disclosure of patents and patent applications as a
condition of participation; and (2) the failure to disclose results in the
adoption of the defendant's technology even though another
10

11

318 F.3d at 1108.

See 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶782 (3d
ed. 2008).
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technology would have been preferred had it been known that the
defendant's technology was not in the public domain. One difference
between a government action and a private action is that the private
firm seeking damages would have to show that a different
technology would have been adopted or lower royalties obtained;
otherwise there would be no competitive harm.
As the FTC characterized this conduct in its subsequent case
against Rambus,12 while actively participating in JEDEC standard
setting discussions,
12

Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 (FTC, Aug.
2, 2006), rev'd, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (To the extent it is relevant, HH was
consulted by the defendant after the FTC's remedial order was entered). See also
Union Oil Co. of Calif. (Unocal), ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶15618 (FTC,
July 6, 2004) (finding liability for misrepresentations made to a state agency in the
process of promulgating standards; see ¶203f5; the principal arguments involved
the Noerr immunity for communications to the government).
And see Hynix Semiconductor Inc. V. Rambus, Inc., 527 F.Supp.2d 1084
(N.D.Cal. 2007) (refusing to strike pre-trial jury demand with respect to claim that
Rambus engaged in a course of conduct involving abuse of patent rights in
violation of '2; suggesting that litigation to enforce a valid patent might be part of a
scheme that is unlawful overall; applying Federal Circuit law and concluding that
that Circuit would apply a "causal connection" test:
before otherwise protected litigation can be a part of an "anticompetitive
scheme" claim, the court must first find that the other aspects of the
scheme independently produce anticompetitive harms. Once this step has
been established, the court should ask whether the accused patent
litigation was causally connected to these anticompetitive harms. If yes, an
antitrust plaintiff may then include good faith patent litigation as part of the
anticompetitive scheme.
(disagreeing with Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, &
Christopher Leslie, IP and Antitrust §11.4f (2d ed. 2010), which would segregate
the patent infringement action, considering it alone, and per antitrust liability only if
the litigation is a sham.
The court then found a sufficient "scheme" in these allegations:
The Manufacturers have alleged that Rambus participated in a standardssetting organization, understood its intellectual property disclosure policy,
withheld information about its patent applications, waited until the industry
was irreversibly "locked in" to the standard, and then began a litigation
campaign to extract royalties.
527 F.Supp.2d at 1098. At this writing Rambus has won on its patent
infringement claims in a jury trial.
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Rambus refused to disclose the existence of its patents and
applications, which deprived JEDEC members of critical
information as they worked to evaluate potential standards.13
Rambus took additional actions that misled members to
believe that Rambus was not seeking patents that would
cover implementations of the standards under consideration
by JEDEC. Rambus also went a step further:14 through its
participation in JEDEC, Rambus gained information about the
pending standard, and then amended its patent applications
to ensure that subsequently-issued patents would cover the
ultimate standard. Through its successful strategy, Rambus
was able to conceal its patents and patent applications until
after the standards were adopted and the market was locked
in. Only then did Rambus reveal its patents -- through patent
infringement lawsuits against JEDEC members who practiced
the standard.

The result, according to the FTC, was anticompetitive exclusion
resulting in:
increased royalties; increased prices for memory products
compliant with JEDEC standards; decreased incentives to
produce
memory
using
JEDEC-compliant
memory
technology; and decreased incentives to participate in, and
rely on, standard-setting organizations and activities.

13

The FTC complaint alleged that Rambus deceived JEDEC's members by
concealing the facts that it:
was actively working to develop, and did in fact possess, a patent and
several pending patent applications that involved specific technologies
proposed for and ultimately adopted in the relevant [JEDEC] standards. By
concealing this information -- in violation of JEDEC's own operating rules
and procedures -- and through other bad-faith, deceptive conduct....
14

According to the allegations Rambus created the:

"materially false and misleading impression that it possessed no relevant
intellectual property rights" and that it had no plans to enforce any
intellectual property rights that might later become relevant, leaving a
materially misleading impression of its intellectual property ownership and
plans.
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The FTC concluded that Rambus violated '5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act by engaging in exclusionary conduct that
violated '2 of the Sherman Act.
The Commission defined anticompetitive exclusionary
conduct as "conduct other than competition on the merits -- or other
than restraints reasonably 'necessary' to competition on the merits -that reasonably appear[s] capable of making a significant
contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power."15
It
concluded that intentional deception of a standard setting
organization in order to acquire patents to shared technology was
not competition on the merits.16 The opinion also noted that, given
the FTC's broader role in consumer protection, it had developed
"special expertise" in the recognition of deceptive conduct.17
According to its 1983 Policy Statement:
for conduct to be found deceptive, there must have been a
"misrepresentation, omission or practice" that was "material"
in that it was likely to mislead "others acting reasonably under
the circumstances" and thereby likely to affect their "conduct
or decision[s]." Thus, in order to determine whether conduct
(including a course of conduct) is deceptive, we must consider
"the circumstances" in which the alleged "misrepresentation,
omission or practice" occurred. We analyze the legal
circumstances, factual circumstances, and nature of the
15

___ F.T.C. ___, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 at 105,486 quoting 3 Phillip E.
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶651f at 83-84 (2d ed. 2002). The
Commission also quoted the Aspen Skiing formulation that "If a firm has been
'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to
characterize its behavior as predatory." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox 138 (1978).
16

The Commission cited numerous decisions for the proposition that
deception can, in appropriate circumstances, constitute unreasonable exclusionary
conduct, including: Conwood Co., LP v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); Caribbean
Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1262-63,
1270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980).
17

___ F.T.C. at ___, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 at 105,486.
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conduct itself in assessing Rambus's conduct.18

However, before simple deception as defined for purposes of
consumer protection law could rise to a Sherman '2 violation, two
additional elements were needed:
First, under the Policy Statement, the respondent's state of
mind is irrelevant in determining whether the respondent
engaged in deceptive conduct under Section 5. Under Section
2, however, the defendant must act "willfully" in acquiring or
maintaining monopoly power. Thus, for Rambus's allegedly
deceptive course of conduct to be actionable under the
Sherman Act, Rambus must have acted "willfully," as opposed
to inadvertently or even negligently.
Second, the Policy Statement does not require proof of
competitive harm for a respondent's conduct to be deemed
deceptive under Section 5. However, under Section 2, in order
to be condemned as "exclusionary," defendant's conduct must
harm the competitive process, and that anticompetitive harm
must outweigh the conduct's procompetitive benefits, if any.
Thus, for Rambus's alleged deceptive course of conduct to be
actionable under Section 2, the conduct must have an
anticompetitive effect that outweighs any procompetitive
benefit.19
The Commission also noted that while deception is unlikely to
violate '2 in "competitive environments," under the right
circumstances it can cause competitive harm. Here,
deceptive conduct could have caused lasting competitive
harm by obscuring crucial information, known only to one
industry member, until it was too late to counteract the
consequences. In this context, we cannot stress too strongly
the importance we place on the fact that the challenged
conduct occurred in the context of a standard-setting process
18

Id. at 105,487, quoting Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on
Deception (1983), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,205 at 20,911-12.
19

Rambus, ___ F.T.C. at ___, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 at p. 105, 487
(footnotes omitted).
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in which members expected each other to act cooperatively.
We recognize that standard setting of the type sponsored by
JEDEC potentially yields significant efficiencies -- especially
when the standards facilitate interoperability among various
components, to the likely benefit of industry participants as
well as consumers. Although standard setting displaces the
normal process of selection through market-based
competition -- by which, without any agreement, the
purchasing decisions of customers determine which
interoperable combinations of products and technologies
ultimately will survive -- the efficiency benefits of consensus
standard setting easily can outweigh that loss of competition.
... Additionally, unlike misleading statements made in
advertising -- which can be corrected quickly by a competitor's
counter-advertising -- there are fewer "quick fixes" available to
correct the competitive harm caused by deception in the SSO
["standard setting organization"] context, once a standard has
been chosen and the industry has become locked in. If
exclusionary conduct reduces or destroys the efficiencies to
be gained through consensus standard setting, it may cause
considerable harm to competition. If the anticompetitive harm
exceeds any remaining efficiencies, standard setting is no
longer beneficial on balance.20
To this the FTC added:
We do not hold, and our decision should not be read to
mandate, that all SSOs should require disclosure of relevant
intellectual property. An SSO may choose not to require such
disclosures. If, however, an SSO does require such
disclosures, then non-disclosure -- followed by adoption of a
standard incorporating the intellectual property, and royalty
demands against those practicing the standard -- may be
considered a material omission and may constitute deceptive
conduct under Section 5. If an SSO chooses not to require
such disclosures, SSO members still are not free to lie or to
20

Rambus, note 12 at 105,488-105,489, ___ F.T.C. at ___ (citations
omitted). The Commission cited Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
486 U.S. 492 (1988), as a decision in which the Supreme Court had been willing to
base antitrust liability on manipulation of the standard setting process.

14
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make affirmatively misleading representations. In either case,
whether the SSO requires disclosure should be judged not
only by the letter of its rules, but also on how the rules are
interpreted by its members, as evidenced by their behavior as
well as by their statements of what they understand the rules
to be.21
Speaking of anticompetitive effects, the FTC explained:
In order to assess fully the circumstances under which the
alleged deception occurred, we also must understand the
nature of the allegedly deceptive course of conduct, which
combined the acquisition and exploitation of patents with a
cooperative standard-setting process. A patent holder's
market power may be materially enhanced once the patented
technology is incorporated into a standard, as alternatives
become less attractive relative to the chosen technology and
less able to constrain its price. For this reason, Rambus's
alleged course of conduct, if established, could be especially
pernicious to the competitive process.
An SSO may elect to require disclosure of patent positions
before standardization decisions are made, because this
enables SSO participants to make their choices with more
complete knowledge of the consequences -- including the
potential that those practicing the standard may be liable for
patent infringement, unless they negotiate licenses and pay
royalties. If the SSO members prefer a given technology,
notwithstanding the prospect of royalties, they can vote to
incorporate it into the standard. If, in light of likely royalty
payments, members prefer an alternative technology, they
can vote against inclusion of the patented technology.22

21

22

Rambus, id. at 105,489, ___ F.T.C. at ___.

Rambus, p. 105,489, ___ F.T.C. at ___. Compare the sharply contrasting
approach Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 525 (E.D.
Tex. 2006), finding the possibility of an unlawful conspiracy where the standard
setting association knew about the technology and refused to incorporate it into its
standard, with the result that the plaintiff was not able to charge royalties.
Subsequently, however, that court dismissed the antitrust complaint after finding
no conspiracy. See 2007 WL 2688487 (E.D.Tex. Sep. 11, 2007).
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The Commission found evidence that JEDEC expected
disclosure of patents and patent application by its members, that
Rambus participated in discussions concerning the adoption of
standards while knowing of these requirements, and that it
nevertheless concealed its patent applications from the standard
setting group. It also found that Rambus' various presentations to
the standard-setting group were not sufficient to give the group
reasonable notice that Rambus claimed the patent rights in question
or would assert them in the future.
On causation, the Commission also found ample evidence
linking Rambus' conduct to JEDEC's adoption of standards
incorporating Rambus' IP rights, and also linking that adoption to the
creation of Rambus' monopoly power. On the first, the Commission
observed that alternative technologies had been available to JEDEC,
which they could have adopted had they known about Rambus'
claimed patent rights.23 On the second, it found strong evidence that
ram chip technology was likely to gravitate around a single standard,
given the strong need for interoperability with complementary
products.24 The Commission also noted that:
Exclusionary conduct need not be the exclusive cause of the
monopoly position. In an equitable enforcement action, it is
sufficient that the exclusionary conduct "reasonably appear[s]
capable of making a significant contribution to creating or
maintaining monopoly power."25
The Commission also rejected Rambus' argument that
JEDEC would have adopted its technologies even had full disclosure
been made, because these technologies were superior to
alternatives even if a royalty had to be paid for them. 26
Rambus also claimed that no monopoly power was created by
the misrepresentations because there was no "lock in" -- i.e.,
23

See Rambus, note 12 at 105,509, ___ F.T.C. at ___.

24

See 105,509-510, ___ F.T.C. at ___.

25

Ibid., quoting 3 Anitrust Law ¶651f (2d ed), and also discussing Microsoft,
note 16, 253 F.3d at 79.
26

Rambus, note 12 at 105,511, ___ F.T.C. at ___.
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participant manufacturers were free to select alternative standards
that did not infringe Rambus' IP rights. The Commission observed
that the relevant time for considering that claim was when the
nondisclosures or misrepresentations became known and Rambus'
patent rights revealed. By that time, the Commission concluded,
manufacturers had made significant sunk investments in the Rambus
technology.
The D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission, rejecting the
notion that "deceit merely enabling a monopolist to charge higher
prices than it otherwise could have charged" constituted an act of
monopolization.27 The court observed that Rambus' original 1990
patent application included 150 claims and that thereafter Rambus
split the application into the original and 10 divisionals, as continuing
applications.28 It was during the period that it was developing these
ongoing applications that Rambus worked with the JEDEC standard
setting committee.
On appeal, Rambus challenged the FTC on two grounds:
First, it argues that the Commission erred in finding that it
violated any JEDEC patent disclosure rules and thus that it
breached any antitrust duty to provide information to its rivals.
Second, it asserts that even if its nondisclosure contravened
JEDEC's policies, the Commission found the consequences of
such nondisclosure only in the alternative: that it prevented
JEDEC either from adopting a non-proprietary standard, or
from extracting a RAND29 commitment from Rambus when
standardizing its technology. As the latter would not involve an
antitrust violation, says Rambus, there is an insufficient basis
for liability.
27

Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 1795594 (D.C.Cir. April 22,

28

See the discussion supra.

2008).

29

"RAND" means "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" license terms. See
Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1043, 1053-54 (2002), which explores the concept and notes
definitional problems. Typically, the problem is not the "nondiscriminatory"
requirement, which simply means that all licensees get the same terms, but rather
determining how large a royalty is appropriate. See also Janice M. Mueller,
Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 897 (2001).
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The court found the second of these arguments to be
persuasive.30 Mainly, the Commission found, in the alternative that
absent the misrepresentations JEDEC would either have adopted a
non-proprietary standard or else extracted a RAND commitment from
Rambus. However, the Commission had not determined that one of
these or the other would have occurred. The court "assumed[d]
without deciding" that the first alternative would have been
anticompetitive.31 However, the Commission itself had recognized
that there was insufficient evidence in the record that JEDEC "would
have standardized other technologies had it known the full scope of
Rambus's intellectual property."32 Absent such a showing all the
Commission had was an act of "deceptive conduct," which is
insufficient to establish an antitrust violation:
Even if deception raises the price secured by a seller, but
does so without harming competition, it is beyond the antitrust
laws' reach. Cases that recognize deception as exclusionary
hinge, therefore, on whether the conduct impaired rivals in a
manner tending to bring about or protect a defendant's
monopoly power.
In Microsoft, for example, we found
Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive conduct when it tricked
independent software developers into believing that its
software development tools could be used to design
crossplatform Java applications when, in fact, they produced
Windows-specific ones. The deceit had caused "developers
who were opting for portability over performance . . .
unwittingly [to write] Java applications that [ran] only on
Windows."33 The focus of our antitrust scrutiny, therefore,
was properly placed on the resulting harms to competition
rather than the deception itself.34
30

Rambus, ___ F.3d at __.

31

Id. at __.

32

Id. at __.

33

Citing and quoting Microsoft, note 16, 253 F.3d at 76.

34

Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___. The court also discussed Conwood Co. v. U.S.
Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003);
and LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 153 (3d cir. 2002), cert. denied, 542 U.S.
953 (2004).
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In contrast, the Supreme Court's NYNEX decision made clear
that even a fraudulent agreement leading to higher prices is not
inevitably an antitrust violation. The challenger must show harm "not
to a single competitor, but to the competitive process."35 Further,
any price increase must flow from an unlawful exercise of market
power, not just from the deception.36 Here, "the Commission
expressly left open the likelihood that JEDEC would have
standardized Rambus's technologies even if Rambus had disclosed
its intellectual property."37 It continued:
Under this hypothesis, JEDEC lost only an opportunity to
secure a RAND commitment from Rambus. But loss of such a
commitment is not a harm to competition from alternative
technologies in the relevant markets. "[A]n antitrust plaintiff
must establish that the standard-setting organization would
not have adopted the standard in question but for the
misrepresentation or omission."38 Indeed, had JEDEC limited
Rambus to reasonable royalties and required it to provide
licenses on a nondiscriminatory basis, we would expect less
competition from alternative technologies, not more; high
prices and constrained output tend to attract competitors, not
to repel them.39
35

Referring to NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).

36

Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___, citing NYNEX, id., and noting the rate
regulation avoidance consumer fraud scheme that motivated the arrangement; and
also citing 3A Antitrust Law ¶787b in the previous edition. The court also cited,
with this parenthetical: Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1477-78 (9th Cir.
1997) (rejecting a claim that an insurance company's alleged kickback scheme
caused antitrust injury to group health insurance customers where the evidence
showed the scheme caused higher copayments and premium payments, but did
"not explain how the scheme reduced competition in the relevant market"), aff'd on
other grounds, 525 U.S. 299 (1999).
37

Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___ (emphasis in original).

38

Quoting 2 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, and
Christopher Leslie, IP & Antitrust §35.5 at 35-45 (2d ed. 2010).
39

Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___. The court continued:

Scholars in the field have urged that if nondisclosure to an SSO
enables a participant to obtain higher royalties than would otherwise have
been attainable, the "overcharge can properly constitute competitive harm
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Thus, the court concluded, if JEDEC would have adopted
Rambus' technology anyway, but for the deception, although
perhaps at a lower royalty rate, then the deception did not injure
competition. As a result, the Commission failed to demonstrate that
Rambus' conduct was exclusionary, as '2 required.
The court also noted the possibility that a standalone action
under '5 of the FTC Act for deception would have had a "broader
province" than a Sherman Act action.40 However, it expressed
"serious concerns" about the strength of any evidence of deception
involving violation of JEDEC's admittedly ambiguous patent
disclosure policies.
In this case any relevant nondisclosure
requirement would have applied to disclosure of Rambus's "work in
progress on potential amendments to pending applications, as that
work became pertinent."41 Indeed, it seemed clear that at the time of
Rambus' last involvement with JEDEC it "had no pending patent
claims that would necessarily have been infringed by a device
compliant with that [JEDEC] standard."42 This made the case for
deception turn on the view that Rambus had a duty, not merely to
disclose current patents and patent applications, "but also their work
in progress on amendments to pending applications that included
new patent claims."43 The Commission's evidence did not show that
attributable to the nondisclosure," as the overcharge "will distort
competition in the downstream market." 2 IP & Antitrust ' 35.5 at 35-47.
The contention that price-raising deception has downstream effects is
surely correct, but that consequence was equally surely true in NYNEX
(though perhaps on a smaller scale) and equally obvious to the Court. The
Commission makes the related contention that because the ability to
profitably restrict output and set supracompetitive prices is the sine qua
non of monopoly power, any conduct that permits a monopolist to avoid
constraints on the exercise of that power must be anticompetitive. But
again, as in NYNEX, an otherwise lawful monopolist's end-run around
price constraints, even when deceptive or fraudulent, does not alone
present a harm to competition in the monopolized market.
40

Rambus, __ F.3d at ___.

41

Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___.

42

Id. at ____.

43

Id. at ___.
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JEDEC's disclosure requirements were so broad as to apply to
unfiled patent amendment applications, although some witnesses
may have believed so. The court's own perusal of JEDEC's written
policies could find language speaking "fairly clearly of disclosure
obligations related to patents and pending patent applications."
However there was apparently "nothing of unfiled work in progress
on potential amendments to patent applications."
The court
expressed doubt that a "few strands of trial testimony" could make
the Commission conclude that these policies should be interpreted
more broadly.44 Problematically, "JEDEC's patent disclosure policies
suffered from a 'staggering lack of defining details.'"45 Beginning
with the observation that unpublished continuing patent applications
are trade secrets, the court observed:
One would expect that disclosure expectations ostensibly
requiring competitors to share information that they would
otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would provide
clear guidance and define clearly what, when, how, and to
whom the members must disclose.46 This need for clarity
seems especially acute where disclosure of those trade
secrets itself implicates antitrust concerns; JEDEC involved,
after all, collaboration by competitors.47 In any event, the
more vague and muddled a particular expectation of
disclosure, the more difficult it should be for the Commission
to ascribe competitive harm to its breach.48

44

Id. at ___.

45

Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___, quoting Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies
AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed.Cir.2003).
46

Citing Infineon, note 8, 318 F.3d at 1102.

47

Citing, with these parentheticals: Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (stating that because SSO members have
incentives to restrain competition, such organizations have traditionally been
objects of antitrust scrutiny ); Am Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U
.S. 556, 571 (1982) (noting that SSOs are rife with opportunities for anticompetitive
activity).
48

Citing 2 IP & Antitrust, note 38, at '35.5 at 35-51 ("[A]lthough antitrust can
serve as a useful check on abuses of the standard-setting process, it cannot
substitute for a general enforcement regime for disclosure rules.").
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Breach of Promise: the Broadcom Decision
In its Broadcom decision the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff
stated a claim that the defendant's alleged deceptions before a
standard-setting organization monopolized markets for cellular
phone technology and components.49 Both parties participated in a
standard-setting
organization
called
ETSI
(European
Telecommunications Standards Institute) that was in part intended to
establish increased compatibility among cellphone systems. ETSI
required its vendor members to commit to licensing any intellectual
property rights (IPRs) they might hold that are adopted in a standard
to be licensed to others on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
49

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).

See also Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008 WL 258308 (FTC, Jan. 22,
2008). The FTC complained that the respondent Negotiated Data Solutions LLC
("N-Data") reneged on a promise made during the course of its participation in a
standard setting procedure that it would license its technology at a low rate. The
dispute involved two acquired patents in the ethernet field. Before the patents
were transferred the transferor had made written promises to license the
technology for a flat rate of $1000, and all parties to the transfer were aware of
these prior commitments. Then after the standard setting organization adopted the
standard and became "locked in" to it, the firm insisted on royalties that were many
times higher. The respondent settled, but the decision produced a 3-2 split on the
question of market power and also on the reach of '5 of the FTC Act. The
majority found an "unfair method of competition" under '5 mainly because of the
lock-in and the fact that the deception would lead to higher prices in the product
markets affected by the technology, citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy; the Law of Competition and its practice 596-597 (3d ed. 2005) for
application of '5 when "(1) the practice seems anticompetitive but is not
technically covered by the antitrust laws, and (2) the social cost of an error seems
to be relatively small." The dissenters also feared private lawsuits under state or
federal law in the wake of the FTC consent decree, but the majority made a point
of noting that its holding was strictly under '5, which contains no private right of
action, and not under the Sherman or Clayton Acts. On the distinction, see 2
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶302h (3d ed. 2007). In
particular, Commissioner Kovacic was concerned that, while no private federal
antitrust action would lie, some private plaintiffs might find state law more
hospitable. The majority concluded:
We recognize that some may criticize the Commission for broadly (but
appropriately) applying our unfairness authority to stop the conduct alleged
in this Complaint. but the cost of ignoring this particularly pernicious
problem is too high. using our statutory authority to its fullest extent is not
only consistent with the Commission's obligations, but also essential to
preserving a free and dynamic marketplace.
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("FRAND") terms.
Broadcom alleged that ETSI adopted
Qualcomm's proprietary technology in its standards "only after, and
in reliance on, Qualcomm's commitment to license that technology
on FRAND terms."50 The alleged violation was that Qualcomm
demanded:
discriminatorily higher (i.e., non-FRAND) royalties from
competitors and customers using chipsets not manufactured
by Qualcomm. Qualcomm, the Complaint continued, has a
90% share in the market for CDMA-path chipsets, and by
withholding favorable pricing in that market, coerced cellular
telephone manufacturers to purchase only Qualcommmanufactured UMTS-path chipsets.51
In finding a possible '2 violation the court observed that
standard-setting is generally procompetitive and benefits not only the
assemblers and users of technology but also their suppliers,
enabling them to produce large volumes of a product with less risk
that they are committing themselves to a technology that might not
attain widespread acceptance.52 As the court observed, while
standard setting might be viewed as a competitively suspicious
arrangement that limits competition for different technologies, it in
fact switches the focus of competition toward price.53
This is not to say, however, that acceptance, including judicial
acceptance, of private standard setting is without limits.
Indeed, that "private standard-setting by associations
comprising firms with horizontal and vertical business
relations is permitted at all under the antitrust laws [is] only on
the understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan
manner offering procompetitive benefits," and in the presence
of "meaningful safeguards" that "prevent the standard-setting
process from being biased by members with economic
interests in stifling product competition...."54
50

Id. at 304.

51

Id. at 304.

52

Id. at 309, citing vols. 1 and 12 Antitrust Law ¶¶100a, 2233.

53

501 F.3d at 309 & n.4.

54

Id. at 309, quoting Allied Tube, note 47, 486 U.S. at 506-07, which it
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However, the standard setting process could be undermined
by what the court termed "patent hold-up:"
An SDO ("standard-determining organization") may complete
its lengthy process of evaluating technologies and adopting a
new standard, only to discover that certain technologies
essential to implementing the standard are patented. When
this occurs, the patent holder is in a position to "hold up"
industry participants from implementing the standard. Industry
participants who have invested significant resources
developing products and technologies that conform to the
standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their
investment and switch to another standard. They will have
become "locked in" to the standard. In this unique position of
bargaining power, the patent holder may be able to extract
supracompetitive royalties from the industry participants.55
It observed that:
Private standard setting occurs in a consensus-oriented
environment, where participants rely on structural protections,
such as rules requiring the disclosure of IPRs, to facilitate
competition and constrain the exercise of monopoly power. In
such an environment, participants are less likely to be wary of
deception and may not detect such conduct and take
measures to counteract it until after lock-in has occurred. At
that point, the resulting harm to competition may be very
difficult to correct.56
The court then analyzed as follows. Most SDOs require
participants in the process either to disclose IPRs or to commit to
license any IPRs incorporated into the standard on FRAND terms, or
both. This commitment then guides decision making within the SDO
because it enables the members to evaluate the costs of alternative
described as holding that "conduct that undermines the procompetitive benefits of
private standard setting may, at least in some circumstances, be deemed
anticompetitive under antitrust law."
55

501 F.3d at 310.

56

Id. at 312.
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technologies prior to any commitment and lock-in.57 At this time
"[m]isrepresentations concerning the cost of implementing a given
technology may confer an unfair advantage and bias the competitive
process in favor of that technology's inclusion in the standard."58
The court then noted that a standard "by definition, eliminates
alternative technologies" and can make one particular set of
technologies much more valuable than alternative sets that are not
adopted.59 So the reasoning on a '2 complaint was like this: first, ex
ante, the SDO might have adopted any one of several standards,
and in doing so would consider their cost, including the cost of any
necessary IPR licensing. Second, by misrepresenting its intentions
the defendant biased this process so as to exclude alternative
technologies that might otherwise have been selected, and in the
process raised costs to licensees, and thus presumably also to
consumers.60 The court then held that:
57

Id. at 313 ("The FRAND commitment, or lack thereof, is, moreover, a key
indicator of the cost of implementing a potential technology").
58

Ibid.

59

Id. at 314. Speaking of Broadcom, the D.C. Circuit's Rambus opinion

stated:
There the court held that a patent holder's intentionally false
promise to a standard setting organization that it would license its
technology on RAND terms, "coupled with [the organization's] reliance on
that promise when including the technology in a standard," was
anticompetitive conduct, on the ground that it increased "the likelihood that
patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder." To the
extent that the ruling (which simply reversed a grant of dismissal) rested
on the argument that deceit lured the SSO away from non-proprietary
technology, it cannot help the Commission in view of its inability to find that
Rambus's behavior caused JEDEC's choice; to the extent that it may have
rested on a supposition that there is a cognizable violation of the Sherman
Act when a lawful monopolist's deceit has the effect of raising prices
(without an effect on competitive structure), it conflicts with NYNEX.
Rambus, note 27, ___ F.3d at ___, speaking of NYNEX, note 35.
60

See id. at 314, also observing:

The patent holder's IPRs, if unconstrained, may permit it to demand
supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures such
as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly
power.

Hovenkamp, Patent Deception and Antitrust

25

(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting
environment, (2) a patent holder's intentionally false promise
to license essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms,
(3) coupled with an SDO's reliance on that promise when
including the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent
holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable
anticompetitive conduct.61
The Third Circuit noted the defendant's argument that antitrust
liability should not turn on a concept so vague as whether royalties
are "reasonable," given the wide room for interpretation as to
whether a particular royalty is reasonable. The court might have
added that in this case the claim was not simply that the royalty was
"unreasonable" in the abstract, but that it was discriminatory in the
sense that competitor and customers of the defendant were allegedly
charged more if they used technology (chipsets) that was not
manufactured by Qualcomm.62 That particular claim, if proven, is
much easier to analyze than a claim whether a royalty of a certain
percentage is reasonable.
Whatever its absolute size, a
nondiscriminatory royalty is one that is the same to all customers
covered by the RAND obligation. Further, equity relief need be no
more complex than forcing the firm to charge the same royalty to all
consistent with its prior obligation. Whether such relief ought to
come under the antitrust laws is a different issue.
On the exclusionary practice analysis the court concluded that
the complaint:
... adequately alleged that Qualcomm obtained and
maintained its market power willfully, and not as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident. Qualcomm excluded competition and
refused to compete on the merits. As discussed above, the
Citing Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market
Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1, 5, 10-11 (2005).
61

Id. at 314.

62

See 501 F.3d at 304.
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alleged anticompetitive conduct was the intentional false
promise that Qualcomm would license its WCDMA technology
on FRAND terms, on which promise the relevant SDOs relied
in choosing the WCDMA technology for inclusion in the UMTS
standard, followed by Qualcomm's insistence on non-FRAND
licensing terms. Qualcomm's deceptive conduct induced
relevant SDOs to incorporate a technology into the UMTS
standard that they would not have considered absent a
FRAND commitment.63

The court also rejected the complaint of the defendant and
some amici that the complaint was of refusal to deal by another
name, and that the court was simply being asked to extend the
reasoning of unilateral refusal to deal cases. The court noted that
this could not be an attempt to apply refusal-to-deal law in conflict
with the Supreme Court's Trinko decision64 to circumstances where
the parties had no prior relationship.65 Rather,
... Qualcomm is alleged to have actively marketed its WCDMA
technology for inclusion in an industry-wide standard, and to
have voluntarily agreed to license that technology on FRAND
terms. We note, albeit in passing, that the Court in Verizon
pointed as well to the extensive regulatory framework that
created oversight functions and remedies that the antitrust
laws were unsuited to augment.
No such regulatory
66
framework exists here.
The court also rejected the argument that "monopoly" is the
inevitable result of a standard setting process because a single
standard is chosen and this was really no more than a dispute about
who should own that standard. As the court noted, however, nothing
in the complaint suggested that the participants could not have
adopted a non-proprietary technology in which royalties or
63

501 F.3d at 315.

64

Referring to Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
65

On this point, see 3B Antitrust Law ¶772e (3d ed. 2008).

66

Id. at 316-317, discussing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 404-410.
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exclusionary power would not be owing to anyone.67 And, of course,
prices would be lower if they had adopted the technology of a firm
that promised a lower royalty and then adhered to its promise.
Conclusion
While deception about one's IP rights or intentions in the course
of participating in standard setting is reprehensible conduct, not
much of it constitutes a violation of '2 of the Sherman Act. As the
D.C. Circuit noted in Rambus, such a violation requires some kind of
"exclusion" and not merely higher prices such as might result from
fraud in a transaction.
$

Rambus poses difficulties for two reasons. First, the
patent continuation process of which Rambus availed
itself is fully sanctioned by the Patent Office and the
Federal Circuit, notwithstanding that we might find
many of its features to be anticompetitive and inimical
to the encouragement of innovation.68 Second, in
Rambus the standard setting organization had been
woefully deficient in articulating its disclosure
requirements.
In the case of clear deception in
violation of clearly articulated disclosure requirements
we would give the patentee the burden of showing that
its deception was non-exclusionary -- that is, that a
member later charged with infringement would have
adopted the patentee's technology even if the truth had
been known. We would not find liability if the deception
is not clear because the organization failed to articulate
its disclosure requirements, as the Rambus case
suggests. The obligation of disclosure runs in both
directions. The technology that is subject of a patent
continuation may be subject to trade secret protection
during the time that a patent application is pending and
unpublished,69 and the duty to disclose should only be
inferred from a clear statement.

67

Ibid.

68

See Lemley and Moore article, note 1.

69

See, e.g., Bond/Pro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463 F.3d
702 (7th Cir. 2006).
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$On the other side, the conduct requirement70 for the
monopolization offense seems clear if the defendant's
misrepresentations induced the SSO to adopt its
technology to the exclusion of an alternative technology
that would have been preferable.
$

As to Broadcom,71 breach of a promise is only rarely an
antitrust violation. The more obvious remedy for
breach of a promise to license at a certain rate would
be a contract suit, or perhaps use of a doctrine such as
equitable estoppel to prevent the defendant from
reneging on its promises. Nevertheless, we would
apply '2 to a situation in which a patentee represents
that it would charge a low royalty and later insists on a
higher royalty, unless it is clear that the standard
setters would have taken the patentee's technology
even at the higher rate. If they would not have done
so, then the misrepresentation resulted in substitution
away from alternative patented technology or
technology that was in the public domain. A sequence
of (a) deception about one's current or contemplated
patent rights; plus (b) the alleged infringer's adoption of
the covered technology in reliance on this deception;
and then (c) the patentee's announcement in
contradiction to the statements in (a) is clearly improper
conduct. If accompanied by the structural components
of the monopolization offense we would place the
burden on the patentee to show that the other party
would have adopted the technology even if the
misrepresentation had not been made. Presumably
that burden could be met by a showing that no suitable
alternative technology was realistically available.

70

The structural requirement could be met either by a defendant who was
already a monopolist or else by a showing that the deception did or would have
lead to the creation of a monopoly. The situation is analogous to monopoly
created or perpetuated by a wrongful infringement suit. See 3 Antitrust Law
¶706a3.
71

See note 49.
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In a situation such as Broadcom the more
marginal case occurs when the alternative technology
would have been in the public domain. Suppose, for
example, that the members would have been willing to
pay $6 for the patentee's technology but at any higher
price they would have preferred public domain
technology. The patentee misleadingly promised that
the technology would cost $6 or less, but then later
charged $10. In that case the deception results in
higher prices, presumably to customers as well, but is it
an "exclusionary" practice. given that no firm controls
the public domain? Of course, a fraudulent patent
infringement suit can do exactly the same thing.72 It
may give the patentee a monopoly on something that
rightfully belongs in the public domain.

72

See 3 Antitrust Law ¶706 (3d ed. 2008).

